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Making Your Vote Count: STV in New Zealand

By Andrew O'Malley Shand

With the 2020 election coming ever closer, the efforts to encourage people to vote have ramped up, with many campaigns encouraging voters to make their vote count. However, there is some debate around whether all votes actually count under our current system, and whether there is a better electoral model. In particular, the STV (Single Transferrable Vote) system has attracted a lot of attention. Would adopting STV be an appropriate way to address the issues within our electoral system?

History

Historically, First Past the Post (FPP) was the electoral system in New Zealand and reigned from 1853 until 1996.[1] FPP worked on a simple plurality basis, where voters in an electorate would choose a candidate to represent them. The candidate with the most votes is then elected to Parliament.

Proponents of FPP argued that it was a stable system, leading to single-party Governments. However, the failures of the system were evident; the system appeared to favour larger parties and gave rise to electoral oddities – for example in the 1966 election, the Social Credit Party gained 9% of the vote and yet won only a single seat; and in 1978 the Labour Party won ten-thousand more votes than the National Party, but won 11 fewer seats in Parliament.[2] In 1979, the Labour Party adopted policy to consider  proportional representation.

In 1986, the Royal Commission on the Electoral System recommended a change to a Mixed-Member Proportional system (MMP) and cited many reasons for doing so; including legitimacy, fairness, effective representation of constituents – in particular Māori and other minority and special interest groups –  political integration, and effective voter participation, government, Parliament, and parties.[3]

A binding referendum was held in 1993, offering voters the choice between FPP and a new system. MMP won the vote with a majority of 53.9% and was implemented by the 1996 election.[4]

Trends

In 1993, under FPP, the ‘major’ parties, Labour and National, secured approximately 70% of the vote, and approximately 90% of the seats. [5] In 1996, under MMP, the major parties won approximately 70% of the vote, and 67.5% of the seats.[6] The difference between the two years is remarkable – it appears that proportionality won the day.

However, even under MMP, in the 1996 election, of the 2.135 million votes cast, 156,248 party votes were for parties that did not achieve any representation in Parliament.[7] Thus, approximately 7.5% of all votes were wasted in 1996. This is double the 3.6% of votes that were wasted in the 1993 election. To state that MMP caused more wasted votes would not be a fair conclusion; but, rather, that a greater proportion of the population were more inclined to vote for minor parties as the new system would reward voters for doing so. Given this, as some minor parties were too small to gain representation in Parliament, it is unsurprising that a greater proportion of votes are ‘wasted’ following the introduction of MMP. What MMP achieved was better representation, but overall, a greater percentage of the population’s votes were wasted.

This has not particularly improved over time; in the 2017 election, of a total 2.630 million votes, 121,412 party votes were for parties that did not receive any seats in Parliament.[8] This figure represents approximately 4.6% of all valid votes. Despite the success of MMP in increasing representation of diverse political views in Parliament, last election almost one in twenty of all valid party votes were functionally useless. The results of the 2017 election were not an anomaly either; in 2014 approximately 6.2% of all valid votes were wasted.[9]

Since the 1980s, voter turnout has steadily declined from a high of 89% in 1984 to a low of 70% in 2011. [10] Voter turnout increased from just below 80% to just above 80% in 1996 – when MMP was introduced – before decreasing to new lows in 1999 and 2002. It is unlikely that MMP has significantly improved voter turnout in this time, as electoral reform barely bucked the trend.

The Ministry of Social Development conducted a study in 2016; they found that in regard to the 2011 election – the lowest voter turnout in New Zealand ever – 21% “didn’t get around to it, forgot, or were not interested”, another 12.3% of non-voters said they did not register and a further 10% were “overseas or away on election day”.[11] Interestingly, 7.1% of non-voters said they did not think that their vote would make a difference, which was a 3.9% increase from the 2008 election.[12] In the 2008 election, 6.55% of all votes were wasted, whereas in 2011, only 3.37% of votes were wasted.[13] In 2014, over 50% of non-voters said they did not feel engaged.[14]

So,  following the 2008 election where a high proportion of votes were wasted, in the 2011 election, the decreased percentage of wasted votes roughly equated to the increased percentage of non-voters who refuse to do so because they feel as if their vote does not make a difference – this may suggest that those whose votes were wasted did not bother to vote in the 2011 election for this reason. This correlation does not necessarily mean causation; but it is an interesting data point. While MMP improves representation to small parties and a secures a more representative democracy, the new system has not abated issues of lower voter turnout and an increased, and significant, percentage of wasted votes. This indicates that further electoral reform may be necessary to improve voter turnout and representation.

STV

Enter STV. STV, or the Single Transferrable Vote, is an electoral system that rewards voters who want to vote for a less popular candidate, without feeling pressure to vote ‘strategically’ to avoid splitting the vote or voting against and candidate rather than voting for their preference.[15]

Unlike MMP, rather than ticking the single candidate that one wishes to vote for, STV requires voters to rank the candidates; 1 for the first choice, 2 for the second choice, etc. There is no requirement to vote for more than one candidate, but it gives the option of having a second choice.

Listing a candidate as a second choice is useful if the top choice does not have enough support to win, or if the most popular candidate has a surplus of votes (in the case of multi-member vacancies explained below).  

Hesitation to implement STV is partially due to the system’s perceived complexity. For example, in Canada, when British Colombia held a referendum on adopting a form of STV, most ‘no’ voters cited a lack of knowledge as their reason for voting against it.[16]

This electoral system has existed in New Zealand for decades at the levels of some local Governments and for all District Health Boards. The Local Electoral Act 2001 secures the ability of city and regional councils to implement STV.

In 2020 alone, this system has been introduced to several more district councils, including Nelson, Far North, and my home-town – Hamilton – where the 2016 mayoral election crowned Andrew King victorious against now-Mayor Paula Southgate by a mere 6 votes.[17]

The Local Electoral Act 2001 sets out the general description of the Single Transferable Voting electoral system at section 5B:

5B General description of Single Transferable Voting electoral system

For local electoral purposes, the Single Transferable Voting electoral system,—

(a)          in the case of an election for multi-member vacancies, has the following features:

(i)           voters express a first preference for 1 candidate and may express second and further preferences for other candidates:

(ii)           a quota for election is calculated from the number of votes and positions to be filled:

(iii)          the first preferences are counted and any candidate whose first preference votes equal or exceed the quota is elected:

(iv)         if insufficient candidates are elected under subparagraph (iii), the proportion of an elected candidate’s votes above the quota is redistributed according to voters’ further preferences, and—

(A)          candidates who then reach the quota are elected; and

(B)          the candidate with the fewest votes is excluded:

(v)           the excluded candidate’s votes are redistributed according to voters’ further preferences:

(vi)         if insufficient candidates are elected under subparagraphs (iv) and (v), the steps described in subparagraphs (iv) and (v) are repeated until all positions are filled:

(b)          in the case of an election for a mayoral or single member vacancy, has the following features:

(i)            voters express a first preference for 1 candidate and may express second and further preferences for other candidates:

(ii)          an absolute majority of votes for election is calculated from the number of votes and positions to be filled:

(iii)         the first preferences are counted and, if a candidate’s first preference votes equal or exceed the absolute majority of votes, that candidate is elected:

(iv)         if no candidate is elected under subparagraph (iii), the candidate with the fewest votes is excluded and that candidate’s votes are redistributed according to voters’ further preferences:

(v)          if no candidate is elected under subparagraph (iv), the steps described in subparagraph (iv) are repeated until a candidate is elected:

(c)          in the case of a poll, has the features specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) as if, with all necessary modifications, every reference to a candidate were a reference to the matter or matters that are the subject of the poll.

If STV were to be applied at a national level to the General Election, it could be implemented similarly to either subsection 5B(a) – for multi-member vacancies, similar to how some city councils are elected; or, sub-section 5(b) for a single member vacancy, similar to how some local mayors are elected.

Implementation of elections based upon multi-member vacancies would likely require either an enlargement/merging of existing electorates; for example a hypothetically merged Auckland Central-Epsom-Tamaki electorate, which, between them, in 2017 sent two MPs from the National Party, and one MP from the Act Party to Parliament, despite 26% of Epsom, 49% of Auckland Central, and 29.5% of Tamaki voting for the Labour Party or the Green Party.[18]

A lower-maintenance solution than redrawing electorate boundaries would be to implement STV based upon single-member vacancies. For example, in the Auckland Central electorate, National’s Nikki Kaye won the 2017 contest with 45% of the vote. The Labour candidate, Helen White, received 40% of the vote, and the Green candidate Denise Roche, received 10% of the vote. Under MMP, the National candidate won the seat as she received the most votes. The other 5% of votes are for other candidates.[19] Under STV, the National candidate may or may not have retained the seat. Under STV, assuming that all voters voted for the same first choice, and assuming that more than half of Green candidate voters would have put the Labour candidate as their second choice, the Labour candidate would have likely won the seat in 2017.

Conclusion

Electoral reform cannot be built in a day. New Zealand has come a long way in representation since the days of FPP; MMP has improved on representation of small parties in Parliament – which equates to greater representation of voters. Unfortunately, there has been little improvement regarding voter turnout and wasted votes. STV may offer a solution, where all votes theoretically count. STV acknowledges that many voters align themselves with candidates and parties to varying degrees – and it gives voters the freedom to vote for the candidate that truly represents their interests and views, without feeling pressure to vote against a candidate.

The views expressed in the posts and comments of this blog do not necessarily reflect those of the Equal Justice Project. They should be understood as the personal opinions of the author. No information on this blog will be understood as official. The Equal Justice Project makes no representations as to the accuracy or completeness of any information on this site or found by following any link on this site. The Equal Justice Project will not be liable for any errors or omissions in this information nor for the availability of this information.

Featured image source: Elliott Stallion on Unsplash

[1] Ministry for Culture and Heritage “First Past the Post” (13 January 2016) New Zealand History <www.nzhistory.govt.nz>.

[2] Electoral Commission “1890-1993 General Elections” <www.elections.nz>.

[3] Royal Commission on the Electoral System Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System 1986: Towards a Better Democracy (December 1986) at 11-12, 64.

[4] Electoral Commission, above n 2.

[5] Electoral Commission, above n 2.

[6] Chief Electoral Office “1996 General Election - Official Results and Statistics” (1997) Electoral Commission <www.electionresults.govt.nz> at 1.1.

[7] Chief Electoral Office, above n 6 at 1.1.

[8] Electoral Commission “2017 General Election – Official Result” (2017) <www.electionresults.govt.nz>.

[9] Electoral Commission “New Zealand 2014 General Election Official Results” (4 October 2014) <www.electionresults.govt.nz>.

[10] Ministry of Social Development The Social Report 2016: Te pūrongo oranga tangata (June 2016) at 153.

[11] Ministry of Social Development, above n 10 at 153.

[12] Ministry of Social Development, above n 10 at 153.

[13] Electoral Commission “New Zealand General Election 2008 – Official Result” (22 November 2008) <www.electionresults.govt.nz>; Electoral Commission “2011 General Election – Official Result” (2011) <www.electionresults.govt.nz>.

[14] Stats NZ Voting and Political Participation (January 2018) at 5.

[15] John Joseph Bartholdi andJames B. Orlin “Single transferable vote resists strategic voting” (1991) 8 Soc Choice Welfare 341 at 341–354.

[16] Gordon McDowell “BC-STV Postmortem (v015)” (video, 2005) Internet Archive <www.archive.org>.

[17] “Paula Southgate wins Hamilton mayoralty after narrowly missing out at last election” (12 October 2019)  RNZ <www.rnz.co.nz>.

[18] Electoral Commission, above n 8.

[19] Electoral Commission, above n 8.